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I. INTRODUCTION
One afternoon, two guards and a sergeant entered the unit . . . . They put
me in leg chains and chained my wrist to my waist. The three escorted
me to a hospital bed within the infirmary . . . . I was then chained to the
bed and my one-piece overalls were taken down. I was held down by the
sergeant and one guard, while the other guard raped me. The men
taunted, ‘So you want to be a woman,’ and ‘we’ll show you how to be a
1
woman.’

This is just one account of a transgender woman being singled out for
sexual violence solely because she identifies as a woman.2 A pre-operative
transgender woman is a person who was born a man and still has male
genitalia, but understands herself to be a woman.3 In an environment
already wrought with sexual abuse and violence, transgender women are
especially vulnerable to sexual harassment and assault.4 In prisons,
transgender female inmates become easy targets of sexual violence both
because of animosity toward the expression of their gender identity, and
because many have slight and effeminate builds.5 While not all of these
1. See
Survivor
Testimony,
JUST
DETENTION
INT’L,
http://www.justdetention.org/en/survivortestimony/stories/sarah_wa.aspx (last visited
Jan. 18, 2015).
2. See id. (providing several individual accounts of transgender prisoner sexual
assaults).
3. See Brenda V. Smith et al., Policy Review And Development Guide: Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual Transgender, and Intersex Persons in Custodial Settings, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST.
NAT’L
INST.
OF
CORRECTION,
3
(2013),
https://www.wcl.american.edu/endsilence/documents/FINAL_LGBTIPolicyGuideAug
ust2013.pdf (explaining that many transgender people change their dress and
appearance to match their gender identity, but while some undergo sex reassignment
surgery, some do not).
4. See id. at 7 (finding that more than fifty-nine percent of transgender women
reported prison sexual assault, a thirteen percent higher rate than non-transgender
inmates).
5. See Targets for Abuse: Transgender Inmates and Prison Rape, JUST
DETENTION INT’L, 2 (2013), http://justdetention.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FSTargets-For-Abuse-Transgender-Inmates-And-Prisoner-Rape.pdf
(explaining
that
female transgender sexual abuse is fueled by ignorance and hostility).
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rapes are perpetrated by correctional staff, rape is frequently used as a form
of abuse by correctional officers and is at least tolerated by prison officials
who dislike transgender individuals.6
This Comment argues that the current prevailing policy of placing preoperative transgender women in male prisons creates an unequal risk of
prison sexual assault.7 Part II explains the role transgender rape had on
shaping the Prison Rape Elimination Act.8 Part III argues that the
deliberate indifference standard is currently the only remedy for
transgender female inmates who are sexually assaulted, and the standard is
too difficult to meet.9 This section explains the difference between
disparate treatment and disparate impact.10 It further contends that
disparate impact can be used by transgender female inmates only after they
have been assaulted, since they must show evidence that they were singled
out.11 Part IV suggests that all states should determine transgender inmate
placement by using the council process and the Prison Rape Elimination
Council recommendations in order to keep prison officials accountable and
to protect transgender inmates.12
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Prison Rape Elimination Act
Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) in 2003,
recognizing the prevalence of sexual assaults in prison.13 The Act created
the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission (NPREC), which was
charged with conducting a comprehensive study on the prison rape problem

6. See id. (stating that many officials disregard abuse complaints because they
feel that transgender inmates deserve the abuse).
7. See infra Part III (arguing that transgender inmates should be able to bring
disparate impact on the basis of their sexual identity).
8. See infra Part II (outlining the reasoning, creation, and results of the Prison
Rape Elimination Act).
9. See infra Part III (explaining that most inmates lose cruel and unusual
punishment arguments because they cannot establish that prison officials had actual
knowledge of a substantial risk of sexual abuse on female transgender inmates).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part III (stating that without evidence of some act which proves the
inmate was specifically targeted because of their gender identity, transgender inmates
will always lose equal protection claims).
12. See infra Part IV (advocating for using a hybrid of two current committees as a
model for state prison transgender placement councils).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 15609 (2003) (passing unanimously in both houses of
Congress).
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and providing recommendations.14 In 2009, the NPREC released its report,
which focused on the need for better intake screening for groups more
vulnerable to sexual abuse, noting that male-to-female transgender
individuals have a higher risk.15 The report goes on to discuss the amount
of involvement and/or participation of prison officials in transgender sexual
harassment and assaults, why they participate, and the effects of their
involvement.16 The NPREC recommended that prisons not rely on isolated
custody to protect at-risk inmates and discouraged housing at-risk groups in
segregated units.17 In 2012, after consideration of the NPREC report, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) released the first-ever federal rule setting
national standards for preventing rape in correctional facilities.18 The new
rule requires all correctional facilities that receive federal funding to screen
LGBTI inmates to determine where they should be placed.19 The rule
prohibits placing these inmates in separate facilities designated by their
sexual orientation, unless the facility was established pursuant to a consent
decree, legal judgment, or the inmates consented.20 The rule does not allow
transgender inmate placement solely on the basis of genitalia.21 The rule
further instructs intake officials to consider the following factors when
determining placement: (1) health and safety of the inmate; (2) potential
security issues; and (3) consideration of the inmate’s views regarding their
safety.22 Federally funded facilities were given three years to comply with
14. See Prison Rape Elimination Act, NAT’L PREA RESOURCE CTR.,
http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/about/prison-rape-elimination-act-prea (publishing
what would become a final Department of Justice Rule in August 2012, which includes
required screening for inmates at risk of sexual abuse to inform housing, bed, work,
education, and program assignments).
15. NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N REPORT 73 (2009),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf (explaining that gender-nonconforming
individuals are often targeted in men’s correctional facilities which have extremely
masculine cultures).
16. See id. (finding that some corrections officials erroneously presume that maleto-female transgender inmates are homosexual and therefore are consenting to the sex).
17. See id. at 78 (recommending increased attention to whom at risk inmates were
placed with).
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Releases Final Rule to
Prevent, Detect and Respond to Prison Rape (May 17, 2012)
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-final-rule-prevent-detectand-respond-prison-rape.
19. National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed.
Reg. 37106 (Jun. 20, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115).
20. See id. (prohibiting such placement in juvenile facilities).
21. See id. (mandating case-by-case placement decisions to ensure inmate health
and safety).
22. See id. (noting that for too long sexual abuse against prisoners has not been
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the rule, expiring in June 2015.23
B. Placement According to Genitalia Is the Prevailing Method Used In
U.S. State Prisons
Although both the NPREC and the DOJ emphasize the importance of
considering several factors when placing transgender women prisoners,
state prisons continue to take the simplest route by placing inmates
according to their genitalia at the time of confinement.24 Five states (Idaho,
Texas, Indiana, Utah, and Arizona) have opted to forego federal funds
rather than to implement the federal PREA standards.25
In both Illinois and the District of Columbia, committees have been
established to evaluate individual inmates and determine the best placement
of transgender women prisoners in prisons and jails.26 In 2013, the Illinois
Department of Corrections (DOC) instituted a new policy that created an
intake committee of twelve people including a chief of mental health and a
psychologist who specializes in gender identity issues.27
When a
transgender woman comes to the Illinois DOC, the transgender woman is
first evaluated by a doctor for a physical and mental health exam.28 The
doctor talks to the inmate about his or her anatomy, sexual orientation, and
any history of hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgeries.29 Within
taken as serious as sex abuse outside of prison).
23. See id. (making the standards immediately binding on all Federal prisons).
24. See Giraldo v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 237
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (telling the story of Alexis Giraldo, a transgender woman, placed
in one of the country’s most violent male prisons despite a recommendation that she be
placed in a woman’s prison).
25. See Rebecca Boone, Some States Refusing to Comply with Law Designed To
Reduce Prison Rape, HUFFINGTON POST (May 24, 2014 10:59 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/24/prison-rape-law_n_5383894.html
(explaining that these states opted to forego federal funding because they believe it will
cost too much money to implement and believing that state programs are sufficient).
26. See Alison Flowers, A Decade in the Making: Revamped Policy Evaluates
Transgender Prisoners in Illinois, MEDILL JUST. PROJECT, (May 29, 2013),
https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/news/IDOCintheNews/Documents/2013/Transgender.p
df; see also Amanda Hess, Trans Slammer: Are D.C.’s Transgender Inmates Still
Screwed?,
WASHINGTON
CITY
PAPER,
(Mar.4,
2009),
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/sexist/2009/03/04/trans-slammer-are-dcstransgender-inmates-still-screwed/.
27. See Flowers, supra note 26, at 3 (explaining that while transgender inmate
preference is considered, they will not be placed in any facility simply because that is
their preference).
28. See id. at 4 (detailing transgender inmate intake procedures).
29. See id. (noting that the committee considers the amount of previous gender
identity treatment received when deciding placement).
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thirty days of the doctor’s evaluation, the committee meets to discuss the
inmate’s placement.30 While few transgender women want to be placed in
a female facility, Illinois uses the presumption that placing female
transgender inmates in female prisons is the safest housing policy.31
The Washington, D.C. committee is slightly more comprehensive,
consisting of a doctor, mental health professional, correctional supervisor, a
chief case manager, and an approved DOC volunteer who is either
transgender or considered an expert in transgender affairs.32 Unlike
Illinois, D.C. wardens can assign inmates to facilities inconsistent with the
committee’s recommendation.33
Rikers Island is a pre-trial confinement compound in New York City
made up of several separate housing units; however, it faces the same
issues with transgender placement as state prisons.34 For over thirty years,
gay or transgender inmates were automatically segregated from the rest of
the jail population.35 This facility, known as “gay housing,” was allegedly
intended to protect gay and transgender prisoners from sexual violence, but
at a cost.36 This unit was shut down in 2005, and replaced with the option
of protective custody for those gay and transgender inmates that desire
protection, although this meant the inmates were isolated twenty-three
hours a day.37 At the end of 2014, the facility opened a housing unit
specifically for male-to-female transgender inmates.38 Although the
facility has approximately enough beds to accommodate the typical
population of transgender women, it will only house those transgender

30. See id. at 3 (detailing the committee’s quick decision making).
31. See id. at 4 (justifying Illinois’ preference for placing transgender women in

female facilities because “Housing women based on their gender identity is the single
most important thing that can be done to protect her from sexual abuse.”).
32. Hess, supra note 26.
33. See id. (allowing a warden to go against the committee’s vote so long as there
is a written justification sent to the director of the DOC).
34. Rikers Island Facilities, CITY OF NEW YORK DEP’T OF CORRECTION,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doc/html/about/locate-facilities.shtml (last visited Mar. 8,
2015).
35. Paul von Zielbauer, New York Set to Close Jail Unit for Gays, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 30, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/30/nyregion/30jails.html?_r=0.
36. See id. (reporting that the gay housing wing became dangerous because nongay inmates would request the unit to prey on those they perceived as weak).
37. Christopher Mathias, New York’s Largest Jail to Open Housing Unit For
POST
(Nov.
18,
2014),
Transgender
Women,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/18/rikers-transgenderwomen_n_6181552.html.
38. See id.
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inmates who wish to be moved there.39 This unit will keep the inmates
protected from the general population without subjecting them to twentythree hours a day of isolation.40 In addition, the New York City DOC is
recruiting new staff that will be specially trained to work with transgender
women.41
C. Lack of Prison Accountability
1.

Farmer v. Brennan: Deliberate Indifference

The Eighth Amendment gives inmates the right to safe incarceration
conditions.42 In 1994, Dee Farmer, a pre-operative transsexual woman,
brought a landmark cruel and unusual punishment claim to the Supreme
Court.43 Under Farmer, an inmate has a viable Eighth Amendment claim
based on deliberate indifference if the prison officials fail to take
reasonable action to protect an inmate who faces a known substantial risk
of serious harm.44 After being moved several times for protection, Farmer
was beaten and raped in her cell.45 She lost her deliberate indifference
claim because the court required the prison officials to have actual
knowledge that she was at a substantial risk of rape.46
Placement of transgender women in male facilities also extends to
immigrant detention facilities, where the same risk of sexual assault
exists.47 In Guzman-Martinez v. Correctional Corp. of America, a

39. See id. (stating that thirty beds is sufficient for the number of transgender
women at Riker’s Island at any given time).
40. See id.
41. Press Release, NYC Dep’t of Corr., DOC Opens New Housing Unit for
Transgender
Women
on
Rikers
Island
(Nov.
18,
2014),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doc/downloads/pdf/press/DOC_OPENS_NEW_HOUSING_
UNIT_n.pdf. (noting the extra precautions taken to keep transgender women safe).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
43. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (arguing that the prison
should have known that since she had breast implants, wore her prison uniform in a
feminine manner, and had tried to remove her male genitalia, she was especially
vulnerable to sexual assault).
44. See id. at 837 (rejecting adoption of an objective test which would allow
liability whether a risk of serious harm was known or should have been known).
45. See id. at 830 (noting that Farmer was transferred from a correctional institute
to a penitentiary, which typically has heightened security due to housing more violent
prisoners).
46. See id. at 837 (finding that since Farmer never expressed safety concerns to the
prison officials, they did not have actual knowledge that she was potentially in danger).
47. See Guzman-Martinez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV 11-02390-PHX-NVW,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97356, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2012).
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transgender detainee was housed with male detainees.48 While there, a
correctional officer sexually abused her and then threatened to “give” her to
the male detainees.49 Even after she reported the abuse, the facility did not
move her to a single occupancy cell.50 Similar to Farmer, the court found
that there was no evidence the detention facility exercised deliberate
indifference by placing her in a male facility.51
In Inscoe v. Yates, however, the court did find prison officials were
deliberately indifferent.52 The difference in this case is that a prison guard
actually opened Inscoe’s cell for two male inmates who proceeded to take
turns brutally raping her.53 The court found sufficient evidence in the
guard’s actions to show that he knew letting two male inmates into a
transgender woman’s cell would put her at a substantial risk of sexual
assault.54
2.

Mitchell v. Price

Mitchell, a transgender woman held at a Wisconsin jail, brought an equal
protection suit against the facility and six corrections officers.55 After
Mitchell was transferred to the Public Safety Building, inmates began to
taunt and harass her.56 She complained and was moved to another pod,
however, three days later she was being transferred back.57 The court
found that Mitchell could not substantiate an equal protection claim based
on her transfer.58 The court stated that both parties agreed that Mitchell’s
equal protection claims based on her transgender status should receive
48. See id. (noting she was continually sexually harassed by other detainees).
49. See id. at *8 (explaining that the correctional officer made Guzman watch as

he ejaculated into a cup and made her drink it).
50. See id. at *4.
51. See id. at *8 (holding that a detainee’s desire to be free from discomfort does
not amount to loss of a liberty interest).
52. See Inscoe v. Yates, No. 1:08-cv-01588-DLB PC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92012, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009).
53. See id. (noting that the two inmates violently raped her and she was denied
medical aid for several hours).
54. See id. (finding the guard guilty of deliberate indifference).
55. Mitchell v. Price, No. 11-cv-260-wmc, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *4
(W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 2014) (noting that only the correctional officer who treated her
differently and called her a hermaphrodite survived summary judgment).
56. See id. (detailing three days of inmates calling her a faggot and threatening
violence).
57. See id. at *9 (citing an incident report in which one deputy told believed the
hermaphrodite should return to her original cell).
58. See id. at *32 (finding no evidence that Mitchell’s transfer to segregation was
any different treatment than received by other inmates who break rules).
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heightened scrutiny, although not all courts hold this to be true.59 In order
to meet her burden in an equal protection claim, a transgender female
inmate must prove that: (1) she has been intentionally treated differently
from other biologically male inmates; and (2) there is a substantial
relationship between the difference in the treatment the two groups
received and an important government interest.60 The Mitchell court found
in favor of five out of the six defendants because Mitchell could not
establish the requisite discriminatory intent needed for an equal protection
claim.61 However, the court allowed Mitchell to continue with her equal
protection claim against one defendant because this defendant’s actions
demonstrated discriminatory animus.62
3. Use of Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact in Equal Protection
Claims
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees because they are part of a protected
class.63 In 2012, the EEOC held that discrimination against a transgender
person is discrimination because of sex and is prohibited by Title VII.64
However, applying this to prison sexual abuse cases has proven difficult.65
59. See id. at *19-20 (noting that the Seventh Circuit has not yet decided that
transgender individuals are entitled to heightened scrutiny). But see Glenn v. Brumby,
663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that all persons, whether transgender or
not, are protected from discrimination based on gender stereotypes); Braninburg v.
Coalinag State Hosp., No. 1:08-CV-01457-MHM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127769, at
*22 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2012) (holding that it is not apparent that transgender people are
a suspect class).
60. See Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *22 (requiring a transgender
woman to show she was treated differently than others who are similarly situated). But
see Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 454 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant
negligence is not sufficient to establish intentional disparate treatment).
61. Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *24 (granting summary judgment
because Mitchell had no proof the officers acted based on her transgender status).
62. See id. (holding that a jury could reasonably infer that a staff member making
decisions about an inmate known to have special needs based on her transgender status
would have been aware of a substantial risk to her safety).
63. 2 U.S.C. § 1311 (1964) (prohibiting adverse employment actions based on an
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
64. See Mia Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 at *1 (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt
(classifying transgender discrimination as gender identity discrimination); see also
Exec. Order No. 13152, 65 Fed. Reg. 26,115 (May 2, 2000) (amending Executive
Order 11478 to include sexual orientation protection).
65. See Braninburg v. Coalinga State Hosp., No. 1:08-CV-01457-MHM, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127769, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2012).
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In Braninburg v. Coalings State Hospital, a transgender inmate lost her
equal protection claim because she did not have evidence of either
discrimination or discriminatory intent based on her transgender status.66
Although the Braninburg court did not agree, many courts have now found
that transgender individuals are a protected class, entitled to heightened
scrutiny.67 However, the Braninburg court did concede that transgender
inmates could bring an equal protection claim under the rational basis test,
but only if they are a member of an identifiable class.68 Still, Braninburg
could not show that she was intentionally treated differently from the other
biologically male inmates in the hospital based on her transgender status
because the court did not find circumstantial evidence sufficient to
establish her claim.69
The court refused to consider that Braninburg, as the only transgender
woman inmate, was the only inmate assaulted by prison guards and was
then left alone in an open hospital ward where she was raped.70 The court
found that these facts were not sufficient to overcome the lack of evidence
showing the guards had the requisite discriminatory intent.71 The court
even refused to consider transgender individuals as an identifiable class of
inmates.72 In fact, the court held that she did not meet any of the elements
required to establish an equal protection claim based on her transgender
status.73
While disparate treatment claims have historically been brought for

66. See id. at *23 (dismissing her claim because she only offered conclusory
statements that her sexual abuse was based on discrimination because she is
transgender).
67. See Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *22 (finding transgender
inmates a suspect class).
68. Braninburg, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127769, at *23 (dismissing her claim
because she only offered conclusory statements that her sexual abuse was based on
discrimination because she is transgender).
69. See id. at *23 (holding that when a suspect classification is not present, a
plaintiff can establish an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated
individuals were treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose).
70. See id. at *22, (dismissing her complaint when Braninburg could only offer
that she was in fact, a pre-operative transgender woman).
71. See id. (holding that Braninburg failed to offer any evidence she was targeted
with discriminatory intent based on her gender identity).
72. See id. (finding she did not show that she was a member of an identifiable
class entitled to equal protection).
73. See id. at *23 (stating Braninburg also did not show she was intentionally
treated differently than others similarly situated or that there was no rational reason for
the difference in treatment).
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employment discrimination, the Mitchell court allowed this argument in her
prison claim.74 Likewise, disparate impact claims are now being extended
beyond employment law into fair housing and fair credit reporting claims.75
So far, no transgender inmate has brought a disparate impact claim for
prison sexual abuse.76 Disparate impact claims are traditionally applied to
facially neutral employment practices and generally brought on the basis of
gender or race, although they have also recently been brought based on
transgender status.77 To establish a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must
identify a specific discrimination practice; show that the practice has a
disparate impact on a protected class; and show the policy causes the
disparate impact.78 As evidenced by Mitchell’s use of disparate treatment
outside of the employment context, disparate impact claims are not limited
to employment discrimination cases.79
III. ANALYSIS
A. Transgender Inmates are Extremely Unlikely to Successfully Establish
a Deliberate Indifference Claim Before They are Sexually Assaulted
Because Constructive Knowledge of a Known Risk Is Not Sufficient to Meet
The Burden.
Prison officials have a constitutional duty to take reasonable measures to
guarantee inmate safety.80 However, this only requires prison officials to
take action to prevent sexual assaults if they have actual knowledge there is
a substantial risk to that inmate.81 Because prisoners are required to present
74. See Mitchell v. Price, No. 11-cv-260-wmc, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at
*23 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 2014) (allowing Mitchell to argue disparate treatment in her
prison abuse claim).
75. See Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12-CV-7667, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
104369, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2013) (stating that there is little doubt facially
neutral practices resulting in a disparate impact amount to unlawful discrimination
under the Fair Housing Act).
76. See Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *23 (noting that disparate
treatment claims are traditionally brought in employment discrimination cases).
77. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (explaining that
facially fair employment practices that are discriminatory in application violate Title
VII).
78. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1964).
79. See Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *22.
80. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); see also Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-49 (1981) (holding that although the Constitution does
not mandate comfortable prisons, being violently assaulted in prison is not part of the
penalty imposed on criminals).
81. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (noting that not every injury suffered by one

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

11

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 2

382

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 24:3

evidence both that the prisoner was at a substantial risk of harm and that
the prison officials knew of and disregarded this risk, without proof of a
previous sexual assault or sexual assaults of other transgender inmates, a
transgender woman is likely to lose a deliberate indifference claim.82 As in
Farmer, proving a prison official knew of a significant risk of transgender
sexual assault is what disposes of most deliberate indifference claims.83
The Farmer court declined to define deliberate indifference under tort
recklessness standards, which would have allowed many more transgender
inmates to meet their burden.84 Instead, the court chose to apply criminal
law recklessness, a much higher burden.85 The Farmer court discarded
Farmer’s proposed deliberate indifference test because the term “deliberate
indifference” is in neither the Constitution nor the statute.86 Yet, the court
had no issue requiring prison officials to have actual or constructive
knowledge of a risk for the inmate to be held liable, despite the fact that,
just like deliberate indifference, neither of those terms appear in either the
Constitution or PREA.87 Therefore, because neither the Constitution nor
PREA defines deliberate indifference, the court arbitrarily chose to apply it
in a way that burdens prisoner plaintiffs.88
Farmer’s deliberate indifference claim failed because she could not
prove that prison officials knew her specific cell mate was a substantial risk
to her.89 Although prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from
inmate at the hands of another is constitutionally protected); see also Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1992) (holding that a prison official must have a
sufficiently culpable state of mind to violate the Eight Amendment).
82. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (stating that a prison official’s failure to perceive
a significant risk does not amount to punishment, and thus cannot rise to a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment).
83. See D.B. v. Orange Cnty., No. 6:13-cv-434-Orl-31DAB, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 130993, at *14-17 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2014) (granting summary judgment for
the county although the plaintiff reported harassment and fear of sexual assault and
finding a reasonable fact finder would not find adequate evidence that a substantial risk
existed).
84. See generally Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-41.
85. See id. at 842 (rejecting the argument that absent an objective deliberate
indifference test, prison officials will be free to ignore prisoner safety risks).
86. See id. at 840 (referring to the term as “judicial gloss,” which does not
necessarily govern).
87. See id. at 837, 840; see also Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1989)
(finding liability appropriate when policy makers are on notice of a particular need).
88. See Farmer, 511 US. at 840-41 (explaining that the court is not required to
interpret deliberate indifference under tort recklessness absent a definition in either the
Constitution or the statute at issue).
89. See id. at 840 (holding that prison officials who lack knowledge of a risk have
not inflicted punishment).
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other prisoners’ violence, Farmer could not show that prison officials
consciously disregarded previous threats to her safety by placing her in a
cell with her rapist.90
Leaving an inmate, like Farmer, in conditions where she is vulnerable to
sexual assault is a sufficiently serious deprivation of human needs, which
amounts to a violation of an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights.91 Being
protected from any unwanted physical contact, and especially sexual
assault, is a basic human need.92 A transgender inmate has little ability to
protect herself from conditions of confinement which put her at a
substantial risk of sexual assault, including being forced to shower, expose
formed breasts, and change in front of male inmates.93
This higher burden makes it nearly impossible for any inmate, but
especially a transgender inmate, to bring a successful deliberate
indifference claim because transgender inmates must show prison officials
were actually aware of their higher risk of sexual assault.94 By requiring
inmates to prove prison officials actually knew of a substantial risk of harm
rather than that they should have known, the courts have essentially granted
prison officials with boundless immunity.95
This standard creates a presumption that prison officials are unaware of a
substantial risk of sexual assault to transgender inmates which can only be
overcome by showing there is no question they were not aware.96 In order
for Farmer to have established that the prison officials knew there was
substantial risk of her being raped, the Farmer court would have required
some evidence that her cell mate had specifically threatened her prior to her

90. See id. at 833 (noting that protection from other inmates is a condition of
confinement subject to the Eighth Amendment); see also Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d
158, 161 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding prison officials deliberately indifferent where there
was a pervasive risk of harm to inmates from other prisoners and the officials failed to
respond).
91. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301-03 (1991) (applying the objective
prong of the deliberate indifference test).
92. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (noting that a prison
official’s act or omission must result in the denial of basic life necessities).
93. See JUST DETENTION INT’L, supra note 5, at 1-2 (explaining that transgender
women face extreme danger in male prisons).
94. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36 (requiring an inmate to prove prison officials
were aware of facts that infer existence of a substantial risk of harm and for him to
draw the inference).
95. See id. at 848 (concluding that the district court may have placed decisive
weight on the fact that Farmer did not notify prison officials he feared for his safety).
96. See id. at 841-42 (refusing to hold prison officials liable if they are unaware of
a substantial risk of harm to an inmate, even when the risk is obvious).
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being moved into that cell and that she had reported the threat.97 Despite
the court’s contention that requiring the subjective deliberate indifference
test would not require inmates to be injured by other inmates in order to
obtain an injunction, in application, that is precisely what this test requires
for transgender inmates.98 Farmer had silicone breast implants, wore her
prison issued clothing in a feminine manner and even had a failed operation
to remove her male sex organs.99 Yet the court maintained that this,
combined with known past threats of violence and a transfer to a maximum
security prison, was insufficient to establish that she was plainly at risk for
sexual assault and that prison officials must have known this.100
The difference in the outcomes of Farmer v. Brennan and Inscoe v.
Yates demonstrates how difficult this burden is to meet.101 In Inscoe, a
transgender inmate won her deliberate indifference claim after prison
guards actively participated in increasing her risk of sexual assault.102
After she was finally treated for her first sexual assault, she was moved to a
secluded area and assaulted again.103 But for the prison guard opening the
cell for Inscoe’s rapists, the court would likely have granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.104 Based on the outcome in
Farmer, if the prisoners had attacked Inscoe without guard assistance she
would have had difficulty demonstrating that the guards had actual

97. See id. at 842-43 (explaining that evidence of a longstanding and welldocumented risk of inmate attacks would be sufficient for a jury fact finder to infer the
official must have known about the risk); see also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553, 593 (1923).
98. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845 (applying the subjective test does not deny an
injunction to prisoners who clearly prove their conditions of confinement are unsafe
and life-threatening).
99. See id. at 829 (explaining that Farmer had also undergone estrogen therapy and
resorted to black market testicle removal).
100. See id. (noting that all the parties concede that Farmer projects female
characteristics).
101. See id. at 829-30 (finding that the prison guards did not have actual knowledge
Farmer was at risk of rape); see also Inscoe v. Yates, No. 1:08-cv-01588-DLB PC,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92012, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009) (holding the prison
guards liable when Inscoe had already been attacked and a guard opened her cell for
other inmates).
102. Inscoe, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92012, at *8 (delaying Inscoe’s medical
attention because a supervisor refused to believe a guard aided in her rape after another
guard let them into her cell).
103. See id. at *8-9 (finding that a corrections officer responded to Inscoe’s report
by telling her she likely enjoyed it).
104. See id. at *7-8 (providing a reminder that prison officials must be subjectively
aware of harm for a deliberate indifference claim to proceed).
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knowledge that she was at risk of sexual assault.105 It would be difficult for
any court to hold that a prison guard who opened a door to a female
transgender inmate’s cell for two male inmates did not know his action
subjected her to a substantial risk of sexual assault.106
Although Farmer defined deliberate indifference somewhere between
negligence and acts or omissions for the purpose of causing harm, in
practice, acts or omissions intended to harm transgender inmates are
required to survive summary judgment, and ultimately win a claim.107
Deliberate indifference claims require such a heavy showing of intent that
only inmates who, like Inscoe, can show prison officials participated in
their assault have a chance for their case to reach trial.108 Had either an
inmate or guard assaulted Inscoe in the hospital or a corridor, or even if her
cell mate had raped her, as in Farmer and Braninburg, her claim would
probably have been dismissed.109 In both Farmer and Braninburg, the
transgender inmates were assaulted in their sleeping quarters without prison
officials being physically present or participating, which is largely why
they each lost their lawsuits.110
Short of a prison official actively participating in her assault, a
transgender inmate would have to be subjected to repeated sexual assaults
without the officials acting to survive summary judgment.111 Furthermore,
following Farmer, courts would likely require written reports of previous
sexual assaults or threats of sexual assault to show prison officials were
actually aware of a substantial risk of sexual assault.112 This written report
105. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45 (finding insufficient evidence the guards knew
Farmer’s cell mate would rape her).
106. Inscoe, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92012, at *8 (holding that Inscoe stated a
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against the defendant because he knew of and
disregarded an excessive risk to her health and safety).
107. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836 (equating deliberate indifference to criminal law
recklessness).
108. See Inscoe, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92012, at *8 (finding that a guard’s
participation in her rape was clear evidence of deliberate indifference).
109. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839, 841 (holding that to act recklessly a prison
official must “consciously disregard” a substantial risk of harm to an inmate).
110. See id. at 830-31 (noting Farmer was assaulted at night in her cell); Braninburg
v. Coalinga State Hosp., No. 1:08-cv-01457-MHM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127769, at
*8-9 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2012) (detailing Braninburg’s rape in an open prison hospital
ward).
111. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830 (referencing the fact that Farmer was placed in
the cell she was raped in after previously being segregated for safety concerns).
112. See Mitchell v. Price, No. 11-cv-260-wmc, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at
*28, *31 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 2004) (allowing Mitchell’s claim to proceed only against
the guard who would have seen reports of threats she received in previous cell
assignments and known she was vulnerable to sexual assault).
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requirement, however, amounts to precisely the omission the Farmer Court
insisted was not required to meet the deliberate indifference standard.113
B. It is Nearly as Difficult for Individual Transgender Inmates to Bring
Disparate Treatment Claims Because They Must Show They are Being
Treated Differently Than Others Based on Their Gender Identity.
In Glenn, a transgender woman was successful in her disparate treatment
claim because she had direct evidence that her employer fired her for being
transgender.114 Glenn’s boss openly admitted the adverse employment
action was based on his dislike and discomfort with her transgender
transition.115 Though Glenn was fortunate to have direct evidence of her
unequal treatment, unlike the prisoners’ lawsuits, employment disparate
impact claims do not require it.116 In theory, no equal protection claim
requires direct evidence of discriminatory treatment.117 For this reason,
most disparate treatment employment claims succeed based on
circumstantial evidence from which the jury can infer discrimination.118
However, the opposite is true of prison equal protection claims.119 Courts
require prisoners to provide direct evidence showing they were
discriminated against.120
It is not as difficult to establish that a transgender woman is being treated
differently than a non-transgender male inmate as it is to prove that she is

113. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37 (stating that failing to act in response to a
substantial risk of serious harm is the equivalent of reckless disregard).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th
Cir. 2012) (finding discrimination based on gender non-conformity is sexdiscrimination and protected under the Equal Protection Clause).
115. See Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1320 (calling a man wearing women’s clothing
unnatural and unsettling).
116. See id. at 1320 (stating that a plaintiff can offer direct or circumstantial
evidence to prove discrimination); see also Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287,
1300 (11th Cir. 1999).
117. See Wright, 187 F.3d at 1293-94 (outlining standards of proof for equal
protection claims).
118. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)
(requiring a plaintiff to produce only enough evidence to allow the trier of fact to infer
unequal treatment).
119. See Mitchell v. Price, No. 11-cv-260-wmc, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at
*25, *23 (dismissing her complaint when she could not prove intent). Contra Burdine,
450 U.S. at 256 (allowing either a direct showing of unequal treatment or an indirect
showing the defendant’s proffered reason was pretext).
120. See generally Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *23 (refusing to
accept circumstantial evidence as proof of discrimination).
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being treated differently because she is transgender.121 Inmates, unlike
Glenn, do not have access to the same amount of evidence supporting their
discrimination as non-imprisoned employees.122 The burden for Mitchell
was that absent a confession of discriminatory intent from one of her
defendants, she had no evidence until an incident report was finally filed.123
Because Mitchell was an inmate rather than an employee, she could not
benefit from a presumption of discrimination.124 Had she been an
employee, she could have (1) argued the elements of her disparate impact
claim; (2) the defendant would have had to rebut the presumption; and (3)
she would have another chance to show the defendant’s reason for his
behavior was pretext for discrimination.125 Instead, all but one of
Mitchell’s complaints were dismissed without the opportunity to persuade
the trier of fact that she met the elements of her prima facie case.126
Mitchell was unable to establish discriminatory intent against all but one
defendant because the court would not accept that Mitchell’s guards’ verbal
harassment and apparent mocking of her transgender status, including one
telling the other to look at her breasts and another calling her a
hermaphrodite, was evidence the guards were treating her adversely
because she is transgender.127 Had this been an employment case, a jury
would be allowed to infer that calling a transgender woman a
“hermaphrodite,” pointing and laughing at her breasts, and transferring her
based on perceptions of her transgender status constituted disparate
treatment and discrimination because of sex.128
121. See id. at *24-25 (noting that Mitchell was allowed to bring a disparate
treatment claim against one guard for throwing mail at her, but failed to provide
evidence showing he did so because she is transgender).
122. See id. at *24 (dismissing the complaint against one defendant because
Mitchell failed to prove non-transgender inmates were treated better or provide detailed
evidence that the defendant humiliated her in front of the other defendants).
123. See id. at *27-29 (finding defendant’s defense of calling her a “hermaphrodite”
evidence of discriminatory intent).
124. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (noting the plaintiff has and maintains the burden
of persuasion, not proof).
125. See id. at 250 (outlining the burden shifting analysis in employment
discrimination disparate treatment claims).
126. See Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *24-25, *27-28, *32
(dismissing her claims against four prison officials for lack of evidence of
discriminatory intent based on her transgender status).
127. See id. at *26 (holding that one guard putting his hands in her lunch was
unprofessional but did not violate the Constitution because she lacked evidence he
touched her food because she is a transgender woman).
128. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-52 (1989) (finding an
employer discriminated against Plaintiff based on her gender non-conformity when
executives remarked on her manly speech, clothing, and manner and made promotion
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However, the Mitchell court did hold that a jury could infer
discriminatory intent when the guard moved her back into the cell where
she was being threatened and was ultimately raped, although there were
reports of the harassment and threats reasonably available to the guard.129
Notably, this claim only survived after documented threats were recorded,
and Mitchell had already been subjected to intense sexual harassment.130
But for the written reports, this claim would also have been dismissed.131
Transgender inmates are uniquely vulnerable, not just to the conditions
of confinement, but also because of their inability to protect themselves
legally.132 While employees complaining of unequal treatment can use
other employees, work emails, or statistical evidence to support their
claims, inmates generally only have their own testimony.133 After her
multiple complaints of sexual harassment were ignored, Mitchell finally
filed a written incident report.134 This is the only reason she succeeded in
her final claim because courts simply do not give circumstantial evidence
the same weight in prison claims as they do in a civil employment action.135
Braninburg, on the other hand, had no evidence that she was being
targeted because of her transgender status.136 That, combined with the fact
that the Braninburg court did not consider her to be part of a protected
class, left her unable to successfully bring a lawsuit on equal protection
grounds.137 Because the court would not accept circumstantial evidence as
decisions based on these factors).
129. See Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 171561, at *30-32 (denying summary
judgment because the defendant was a staff member making decisions about a special
needs inmate and would have seen the threat reports before placing her back in the pod
where she was attacked).
130. See id. at *30-31 (drawing attention to the fact that the guard voiced his
opinions of Mitchell through the presence of a written harassment report).
131. See id. at *31.
132. See id. at *27-28 (dismissing a separate complaint because Mitchell only
presented her own testimony that the defendant was unduly rough when transporting
her).
133. See id. (noting that Mitchell only had her own testimony to support her
claims).
134. See id. at *28 (finding no evidence in the record that prison officials ignored a
threat to Mitchell’s safety).
135. See id. at *31-32 (allowing her last claim to proceed based on direct evidence
of discriminatory animus).
136. See Braninburg v. Coalinga State Hosp., No. 1:08-cv-01457-MHM, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 127769, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2012) (dismissing her equal protection
claim for lack of evidence of transgender discrimination).
137. See id. at *22-23 (stating that Braninburg was not a member of a suspect class;
therefore, the state only had to meet the rational basis test).
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sufficient to establish her equal protection claim, Braninburg could not
prove she was intentionally treated differently than other biological males
housed in the hospital ward.138
Since the intent element is so difficult to establish, inmates who have
been repeatedly placed with their rapists or have direct evidence of guard
animosity toward their transgender status have the best chance of
establishing a viable disparate treatment claim.139 Disparate treatment
claims are likely to survive summary judgment when the inmate was placed
in a cell or area with an increased risk of sexual assault because of the
guards’ personal feelings toward transgender women.140 Transgender
inmates are also likely to survive summary judgment on their disparate
treatment claims when there is a sexual assault or harassment report
filed.141
In Inscoe, the court held that a transgender woman had been subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment when a guard allowed other inmates to enter
her cell and rape her.142 Because the court found that the guards’ actions
amounted to deliberate indifference to a substantial and known risk of
sexual assault, Inscoe would also likely succeed on a disparate treatment
claim.143 Inscoe could show that she was targeted because she is a
transgender woman when the guard let two males enter her cell and shut
the door.144 The guard did not allow her attackers to enter non-transgender
male or even homosexual male cells, which shows she was treated

138. See id. at *23 (holding that Braninburg did not show she was treated
differently than other biologically male inmates).
139. See id. (finding she did not show that she was a member of an identifiable
class entitled to equal protection).
140. See Inscoe v. Yates, No. 1:08-cv-01588-DLB PC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92012, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009) (finding a cognizable cruel and unusual
punishment claim when a guard let two inmates into a transgender woman’s cell where
they raped and beat her).
141. See Mitchell v. Price, No. 11-cv-260-wmc, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 171561, at
*31 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 2014) (surviving summary judgment largely because the
guard was aware of a written harassment report).
142. See id. at *29 (allowing a disparate treatment claim when Mitchell had already
been sexually harassed and a guard, who knew this and took issue with her transgender
status, moved her back to the cell she was ultimately raped in).
143. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (requiring a purposeful
action or inaction); see also Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *22 (requiring
intent to prove disparate impact claim); Inscoe, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92012, at *8-10
(finding direct evidence of intentional targeting of a transgender inmate).
144. See Inscoe, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92012, at *8-9 (holding the warden liable
when he told her there was nothing he could do and directing her to report any future
attacks).
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differently than other similarly situated inmates.145 The guard had reason
to know that the other inmates wanted to enter the cell to assault a
transgender woman; thus, she can show he intentionally allowed harm to
come to her because she is transgender.146 Therefore, she could have
established both that she was treated differently than others who are
similarly situated, male inmates, and that she was treated differently
because of her transgender status.147
The facts of Guzman, if applied to a non-pretrial detainee, would clearly
help establish a disparate treatment claim.148 Guzman could easily show
that a detention officer who specifically singled her out for harassment and
abuse treated her differently from other biologically male detainees.149
After reporting the detention officer, she remained in the male housing unit
and was sexually assaulted and threatened with retaliation by another
detainee.150 Guzman is a perfect example of a transgender inmate being
repeatedly targeted because of her transgender status.151 The detention
officials knew from her report of the detention officer that she was being
targeted as a transgender woman and still did not place her in a single
occupancy cell.152 Therefore, a fact finder could reasonably infer that the
detention facility’s actions were based on her transgender status.153 Her
reports of both the guard and detainee attacks and the facility’s failure to
protect her are evidence of unequal treatment.154 Of course, she would
have to show that male detainees who were vulnerable to attacks were
moved to single occupancy cells for their protection, in accordance with the
145. See id. at *8 (noting that the guard specifically buzzed Inscoe’s attackers into
her cell).
146. See id.
147. See id. at *9. (noting that the Prison Rape Elimination Act does not create a
private right of action).
148. See Guzman-Martinez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV 11-02390-PHX-NVW,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97356, at *7 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2012) (noting that the American
Correctional Association Standards require that single occupancy cells be available for
inmates likely to be exploited or victimized by other inmates).
149. See id. at *8 (noting that the officer repeatedly questioned her sexuality and
asked whether other detainees saw her breasts before forcing her to drink his ejaculate).
150. See id. at *8-9 (grabbing her breasts and watching her urinate and get dressed;
threatening more attacks from him and others if she reported him).
151. See id. (being continually targeted by both prison officials and other inmates).
152. See id. at *9 (noting that Guzman-Martinez reported the incident to the facility
immediately but delayed reporting it to the police for fear of retaliation since the
facility had failed to protect her from other attacks).
153. See id. (noting the facility officials did not act after she reported her abuse).
154. See id. at *4-9 (accepting as true her accounts of sexual abuse at the detention
center).
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established standards.155
Unfortunately, similar to filing deliberate indifference claims, most
transgender inmates have to wait to be attacked before they can file a
successful disparate treatment claim because the burden of establishing
intent is too difficult.156 Because the courts in practice require direct
evidence of intentional discrimination on the basis of their transgender
status, inmates are forced to sit and wait to be threatened, humiliated, and
assaulted.157 This scenario is completely the opposite of employment
discrimination claims, where disparate treatment claims are considered
easier to prove.158
In contrast to disparate treatment claims brought under Title VII, inmates
are not able to rely on the benefit of burden shifting.159 Instead, a court
decides whether the transgender inmate has offered sufficient evidence that
shows the prison officials intended to discriminate before allowing the
matter to proceed to trial.160 Inmates lose the use of circumstantial
evidence, commonly used in employment discrimination cases, and prison
officials are shielded from having to show they were not discriminating on
the basis of the inmates’ gender non-conformity.161 Practically speaking,
this means far fewer inmates will be able to provide a court with sufficient
evidence that they are being subjected to unequal treatment because courts
seek direct evidence they are being treated differently due to transgender
status to even survive summary judgment.162

155. See Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
McDonnell-Douglas frame work only requires a showing that a similarly situated group
was treated more favorably than the plaintiff).
156. See Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 825, 841-42 (dismissing the claim because
there was no evidence guards intentionally placed her in a cell to be sexually
assaulted).
157. See Mitchell v. Price, No. 11-cv-260-wmc, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at
*22-30 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 2004) (noting Mitchell’s sexual harassment claims were
repeatedly ignored and she had to be raped before a court would entertain her claim).
158. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (setting the
burden-shifting standard in disparate treatment employment discrimination claims).
159. See id. (shifting the burden to defendant to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his action before allowing plaintiff to prove the proffered
reason is simply pretext).
160. See Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *24-25 (deciding Mitchell did
not submit sufficient evidence to raise a Constitutional issue and not allowing a jury to
infer the prison officials’ actions were based on animus toward Mitchell’s transgender
status).
161. See id. (deciding that a jury can infer discrimination without direct evidence).
162. See id. (dismissing her claim for insufficient evidence).
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C. Transgender Inmates Should Be Able to Bring Disparate Impact Equal
Protection Claims Because Placing Them According to Their Genitalia
Has an Adverse Impact on Them Based On Their Gender Identity.
Disparate impact actions, like disparate treatment claims, are generally
brought for employment or housing claims.163 However, since the Mitchell
court entertained a disparate treatment argument in a prisoner equal
protection claim, transgender female inmates should also be able to bring
disparate impact claims.164 It has already been established that transgender
individuals are a protected class, the first requirement for a disparate
impact claim.165 Therefore, inmates should be able to argue that placing
them in male prisons has a disparate impact on them as transgender
women.166
Equal protection claims brought under a disparate impact theory could
potentially be available for many more transgender inmates than are
disparate treatment claims.167 While employment law disparate impact
claims are more difficult to prove than disparate treatment claims, the
opposite would be true when applied to transgender prison sexual
assaults.168 This is because there is no intent requirement for an equal
protection employment discrimination claim.169 Another reason this is true
is because transgender inmates will not have to provide as high statistics as
employees.170 In employment discrimination disparate impact actions,
employers are presumed not to have intentionally discriminated against an
identifiable group of employees, which is why they are required to show
strong statistical evidence but not intent.171 While employees are often
163. See id. (applying a modified disparate treatment claim to a transgender prison
equal protection claim).
164. See Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171561, at *22 (applying a transgender
employee’s disparate treatment analysis to Mitchell’s claim).
165. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2012) (agreeing with the
Seventh Circuit on transgender status being a protected class).
166. Id.
167. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747
F.3d 275, 281 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, (U.S. Jan. 21, 2015) (arguing for disparate
impact claims to be extended past employment discrimination).
168. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (holding that a lack
of discriminatory intent does not shield facially neutral discriminatory practices).
169. Contra Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1296 (stating that an equal protection claim based
on sex discrimination will not survive without proving intent).
170. See Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991)
(reversing a district court’s ruling that a less than 80% statistical difference did not
amount to disparate impact as a practical matter).
171. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (noting that Congress used Title VII to target the
consequences of unfair employment practices rather than simply motivation).
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expected to show a four-fifths ratio or statistical difference of eighty
percent between two identifiable groups of employees, they are not faced
with the same long-term physical, emotional, and psychological effects that
transgender inmates are.172
Because transgender women are at a significantly higher risk of sexual
assault than are other inmates, placing them in male prisons has a disparate
impact on the character of their incarceration.173 In employment law, a
court generally requires a large statistical percentage, usually eighty
percent, to establish disparate impact.174 However, disparate impact based
on practical significance, while harder to prove in employment cases, can
be used when strict statistical proof is lacking.175 Moreover, such a high
percentage requirement should not be necessary in prison rape cases
because of the violent and persistent nature of the violation.176 Because
transgender inmates have a thirteen percent higher rate of sexual assault
than other inmates, transgender women face more serious consequences
when incarcerated.
The higher risk, combined with the practical
consequences of the assault, should substitute for the requisite eighty
percent higher firing rate for an identifiable group of employees.177 It
would not make sense to require transgender inmates show that they are
eighty percent more likely to be raped in prison than are other inmates to
establish disparate impact.178
172. See Brenda V. Smith, Responding to Sexual Abuse of Inmates in Custody:
Assessing the Needs of Men, Women and Gender Non-Conforming Individuals, PREA
RESOURCE
CENTER
(Feb.
19,
2013),
http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/webinarslidesgendernonco
nformingadults21913.pdf (explaining the systematic infliction of psychological trauma,
general distrust, and likelihood of multiple traumas exacerbate symptoms).
173. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (holding that facially discriminatory practices can
be unlawfully discriminatory).
174. See id. at 430 (holding that employment practices neutral on their face or in
their intent cannot be maintained if they operate to freeze the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices).
175. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1978) (explaining that smaller differences between
groups may still constitute adverse impact where they are significant in both practical
and statistical terms).
176. See Smith et al., supra note 3, at 7 (explaining that disrespect or punishment of
transgender individuals’ expression of their gender identity can lead to depression and
suicide).
177. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429, 439 (noting that Congress intended to prevent
discriminatory employment practices that favored one identifiable group of employees
over other groups).
178. Cf. Bilingual Bicultural Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 642
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (Blalock, J., dissenting) (arguing that showing a statistically
significant disparate impact does not prove practical significance because statistical
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In employment discrimination law, a seemingly neutral policy violates
equal protection if it has a disparate impact on a specific group, be it race,
sex, national origin, or religion.179 In general, transgender women are
housed in the same cells and units as the male inmates, which on its face
appears to be a neutral policy.180 However, this placement keeps
transgender women at a much higher risk of sexual assault than their male
counterparts.181 In addition to sexual trauma, harassment also has a
substantial and lasting impact on transgender women’s mental health.182
When someone is subjected to employment discrimination, they may
suffer a difficulty finding future employment, and personal or familial
stress.183 While these are unfortunate consequences, they are not nearly as
serious or as long-lasting as are the consequences of prison sexual
assault.184 Transgender inmates who are sexually assaulted are often
subjected to repeated sexual trauma, even when moved to another facility,
and this trauma remains with them for a lifetime.185 Additionally, their
discomfort perpetuated by continuous sexual harassment is also
exacerbated by this supposed facially neutral placement policy because the
policy keeps them in the place of their torment despite ample evidence they
are at a higher risk of sexual assault.186 Transgender prisoner sexual assault
does not just cause stress, it causes terrible physical injury and suicidal
tendencies.187
In Farmer, Farmer could have brought a successful disparate impact

evidence does not explain the magnitude of the differences).
179. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428 (finding a policy to have a disparate impact on
black employees as a group).
180. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852 (1994)(explaining that Farmer was
housed with male inmates); see also Mitchell v. Price, No. 11-cv-260-wmc, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17161 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 2004) (noting that Mitchell was placed in
pods visible to other male inmates).
181. See Smith et al., supra note 3, at 7.
182. See id. at 10.
183. Wizdom P. Hammond et al., Workplace Discrimination and Depressive
Symptoms: A Study of Multi-Ethnic Hospital Employees, 1 RACE AND SOC. PROBS. 2,
19-30 (2010) (associating workplace discrimination with depressive symptoms
exceeding general job and social stress).
184. See id. (finding a one percent variance in stress stemming from workplace
discrimination).
185. See Smith, supra note 172 (explaining the long-term effects of sexual abuse on
transgender inmates who remain in the facilities where they were assaulted).
186. Id. (noting that multiple sexual traumas exacerbate symptoms).
187. Id. (citing suicide risk as an additional concern of gender non-conforming
inmates).
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claim.188 Under Glenn, she is a member of a protected class.189 The
prison’s facially neutral policy was to house all biological male inmates in
the same cells shared by other male inmates.190 As a transgender female
who presented herself in a feminine manner, she was at a significantly
higher risk of sexual assault than her fellow inmates.191 The prison policy
of placing Farmer and other transgender inmates in the general population
has a disparate impact on their exposure to sexual assault.192 Her attack in
her cell by the male she shared a cell with is evidence that the policy
caused her increased risk of sexual assault.193 There is no way to show that
she would not have been assaulted had she been housed separately from the
male population; however, she would have been at a significantly lower
risk.194 Since Farmer is a member of a protected class, the prison had a
facially neutral policy, and because that policy caused her increased risk of
sexual assault, she should be able to bring a successful disparate impact
claim.195
Braninburg could also have brought a successful disparate impact
claim.196 She is a member of a distinct group, and many courts would
agree that she is in a protected class.197 She was kept, according to hospital
policy, with other biologically male inmates.198 She was then threatened
188. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825.
189. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318 n.5 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding

transgender individuals a protected class under Title VII).
190. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 830 (noting that following the federal prison
authority incarceration policy she was sometimes held in the general population when
not segregated).
191. See id. at 830 (acknowledging that she was repeatedly placed in segregation
because of safety concerns); see also Sarah, JUST DETENTION INT’L,
http://justdetention.org/story/sarah/?pageno=9 (last visited on Feb. 14, 2016)
(highlighting the increased risk of sexual violence transgender inmates face).
192. See Smith et al., supra note 3, at 7 (noting that sexual assault is 13 times more
prevalent in transgender inmates).
193. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839 (noting that Farmer was moved according to
prison policy into the cell she was raped in).
194. See id. at 830 (stating that Farmer was raped in her cell within two weeks of
being returned to the general population from protective custody).
195. NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 74
(finding that transgender women in male prisons are frequently targeted because of
their gender nonconformity).
195. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431(1971) (outlining the prima
facie elements of a disparate impact claim).
196. Braninburg v. Coaling State Hosp., No. 1:08-CV-01457-MHM, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 127769, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2012).
197. Id.
198. See id. at *10, *11 (explaining that she was repeatedly placed with other male
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and assaulted by other inmates and staff.199 There is ample evidence from
the threats for a jury to find that the threats were based on her transgender
status.200 But for being housed in the male hospital prison ward,
Braninburg would not have had such a high risk of physical and verbal
violence.201
In order for a prison to defend itself against a transgender inmates’
disparate impact claim, it will have to show that the policy of placing
transgender women with male inmates is substantially related to an
important government interest.202
This requirement parallels the
requirement of employers to show their policy is in place for a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason.203 However, state prison officials, unlike
private employers, are subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny.204
Following Glenn, discrimination based on transgender status makes prison
officials liable for discrimination on the basis of sex, and they must,
therefore, withstand intermediate scrutiny.205
Prisons most often argue that security is an important penological
interest and that their policies support that interest.206 When faced with
heightened scrutiny, prisons would likely argue that maintaining secure
correctional facilities is an important government interest.207 While prison
security is definitely an important government interest, prison officials
would have to show that the policy of placing transgender women in men’s
inmates despite reporting numerous verbal threats).
199. See id. at *7-11 (outlining her reports of written and oral harassments and
threats).
200. See id. at *24 (detailing her reports of having her breasts groped by a staff
member).
201. See id. at *10, 11 (listing her multiple housing changes in response to
continuous verbal and sexual harassment).
202. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (establishing that
once the plaintiff has a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the policy).
203. See id. (outlining the employer’s burden).
204. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying
heightened scrutiny in a claim against the Georgia General Assembly, a state
legislature).
205. See id. at 1320. (finding that firing based on transgender status is sex
discrimination).
206. See Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 868 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (holding that
prison safety and security are perhaps the most legitimate of penological goals); see
also Snow v. Woodford, 128 Cal. App. 4th 383, 385 (2005).
207. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 539 (2006) (arguing that prison
policies support a legitimate prison security interest); accord Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401, 403 (1989).
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facilities is substantially related to maintaining a secure prison, which they
cannot do.208 The Prison Rape Elimination Act was created, in large part,
because of the number of transgender prison rapes.209
In fact, if their goal is to increase or maintain security, prisons cannot
justify placing transgender inmates in an area where they are thirteen
percent more likely to be assaulted.210 Placing transgender inmates in male
prisons actually creates security problems by catching the interest of
violent sexual predators, including prison guards, and exposing transgender
inmates to sexual assault.211 Housing transgender women in the general
population with male inmates is not substantially related to the important
government interest of prison safety because their increased risk of sexual
violence raises the quantity and severity of inmate on inmate violence.212
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Both federal and state prisons should adopt a committee approach to
transgender inmate placement.213 A hybrid of the Illinois and District of
Columbia models would be ideal.214 Committees should operate under the
presumption that transgender female inmates should be housed in female
prisons unless and until there is evidence this would not be the safest and
healthiest placement for a specific inmate.215 Although many transgender
female inmates do not want to be placed in female prisons, these facilities

208. Beard, 548 U.S. at 528.
209. NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N REPORT, supra note 15, at 73

(recalling the story of a transgender client who was deliberately placed in a cell with a
convicted sex offender to be raped for more than 24 hours); see also R.W. v. United
States, 958 A.2d 259, 261-62, 267-68 (D.C. 2008) (upholding a D.C. correctional
officer’s conviction and ten year sentence for singling out a transgender inmate and
forcing her to perform fellatio on him).
210. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that a policy cannot be
sustained where there is no logical relationship between the policy goal and the
regulation).
211. See id. at 97 (finding a regulation banning inmate marriage not rationally
related to a legitimate penological interest when it amounted to an exaggerated
response to prison security).
212. See Brenda V. Smith et al., supra note 3, at (providing statistics showing
transgender women and girls in male prisons are increased security risk).
213. See supra Part II (describing transgender placement committees currently
being utilized).
214. See supra Part II (explaining the Illinois and D.C. transgender placement
programs).
215. See Flowers, supra note 26, at 2 (noting that Illinois prefers to place
transgender women in female prisons).
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are generally the safest for them.216 The inmates’ placement preferences
and their reasons for them should definitely be considered.217 However,
their preference should only be one factor in the decision.218 The overall
health and safety of the inmate should control.219
The District of Columbia committee’s inclusion of a DOC volunteer who
is either transgender or an expert in transgender affairs is a great practice,
which should definitely be adopted by prisons.220
Including such
volunteers gives a committee of professionals valuable and necessary
perspective on the effects certain placement options will have on a
transgender woman.221 However, a warden should not be given the
authority to veto a transgender woman’s placement once the committee has
decided.222 A warden could perhaps be included on a committee; however,
the mental health professional, medical doctor, case manager, and DOC
volunteer are in a better position to choose the best placement, especially
after taking the time to examine each inmate’s situation and conducting a
case-by-case analysis.223
Besides evaluating placement options on a case-by-case basis, prisons
need to focus their resources on increased training for their staff.224 Prison
guards are too often the perpetrators of transgender inmate sexual
violence.225 Transgender awareness as well as anti-harassment and sexual
assault training needs to be incorporated into correctional officer training
and then rigorously enforced.226

216. See id. at 4 (explaining that while many transgender women do not wish to be
placed in female prisons, that is not the determining placement factor).
217. See id. (noting that the Illinois committee takes into account the prisoners’
placement preference).
218. See id.
219. See id. (stating that safety of the transgender inmates is the top priority).
220. See supra Part II (listing D.C.’s committee participants).
221. See id.
222. Contra Hess, supra note 26, at 1 (noting that D.C. allows wardens to trump a
committee decision on placement).
223. See supra Part II (explaining the process by which the committee determines
each transgender inmate’s placement).
224. See Mathias, supra note 37, at 2 (noting that New York has begun
implementing increased correctional officer training on how to deal with transgender
and other special risk inmates).
225. See JUST DETENTION INT’L, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining the prevalence of
transgender inmate abuse by correctional officers).
226. See id. at 1 (noting that most abuse stems from correctional officers’ loathing
and lack of knowledge about transgender inmates).
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V. CONCLUSION
Protecting transgender inmates from sexual assault was one of the
primary forces behind the Prison Rape Elimination Act.227 The Department
of Justice recognized the disproportionate risk of rape to transgender
inmates, prison official indifference, and the long-term effects of this
abuse.228 Despite the federal rules and guidance, many states have opted to
lose federal funding rather than comply with methods that would increase
transgender inmate protection.229 Even in federal prisons, placement
according to genitalia prevails, leaving transgender inmates nearly as
vulnerable as they were prior to PREA’s inception.230
Transgender inmates almost always lose deliberate indifference
claims.231 Disparate treatment claims have the potential to be slightly more
successful, but will still require some sort of sexual violation before an
inmate has a viable claim.232 Transgender women inmates need another
remedy.233 Disparate impact claims should be expanded from applying
only to employment and housing to transgender inmates.234 Not only could
this assist the inmates later with counseling services and sex-reassignment
surgery, it would also force prisons to take active measures to ensure
transgender safety.235 While there are flaws in each model of transgender
housing, using a committee to determine case-by-case placement is most
appropriate to balance the transgender women inmates’ psychological
needs and placement preferences with their need for safety.236

227. See supra Part II (detailing the events leading up to the passage of PREA).
228. See supra Part I (detailing accounts of transgender prisoner sexual abuse).
229. See supra Part II (noting that some state prisons disagree with implementing

PREA guidelines).
230. See Rights of Transgender Prisoners, NAT’L CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, 1
(2006),
http://www.nclrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/RightsofTransgenderPrisoners.pdf (stating that transgender
people who have not undergone sexual reassignment surgery are generally placed
according to their birth gender).
231. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
232. See supra Part II (explaining the high deliberate indifference burden).
233. See supra Part III (arguing that disparate impact claims should be used by
transgender inmates).
234. See id. (explaining that disparate impact claims are a better option for
transgender inmates placed in unsafe incarceration).
235. See supra Part II (arguing that prisons are currently not held accountable
because transgender inmates rarely win lawsuits against them).
236. See Flowers, supra note 26, at 4.
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